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Informal settlements are an integral part of the urban landscape in developing countries.  
These settlements are widely distributed within cities, including central business centers 
and peripheral areas with environment hazards.  In most cases, residents of these 
settlements do not have access to basic public services and amenities.  In this paper, we 
examine the impact of interventions, such as upgrading basic services and resettlement 
policies, on the welfare of residents of these informal settlements, who are typically the 
urban poor.  To examine these interventions, we estimate models of residential location 
choice and allow households to be sensitive to commuting costs to work, demand for 
public services, and preferences for community composition. Our empirical analysis is 
based on recently collected survey data from Pune, India, and shows that poor households 
prefer to live close to work and in communities that consist of people sharing common 
socio-demographic characteristics.  From the perspective of households living in informal 
settlements, upgrading settlements in situ is welfare enhancing.  If a household must be 
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LOCATION AND WELFARE IN CITIES: 




I. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
  
The economic geography of cities is inherently uneven.  There is considerable 
variation in housing quality, public services, local amenities, and household 
characteristics among neighborhoods, as well as within neighborhoods.  We observe 
segregation and ethnic clustering almost as commonly as seeing high-rise apartment 
developments located next to slum and squatter settlements.
1  Aggregate phenomena of 
sorting and mixing are intrinsically driven by residential location choices at the 
household level.  Our interest is in examining residential choices in developing country 
cities, as these cities face unprecedented population growth and limiting fiscal 
constraints.  In particular, we want to examine location decisions of households living in 
informal (slum and squatter) settlements, as many new entrants are likely to locate in 
these under-serviced sites within the city.  
  
In many developing country cities, heterogeneity in land management practices 
allows different patterns of development (on both public and private land) across parts of 
the urban landscape.  This leads to under-developed or undeveloped land parcels in many 
parts of the city.  These parcels of land often become home to numerous poor residents in 
the form of slum and squatter settlements, with limited public services.  These 
settlements are often subject to natural hazards (such as flooding), as well as negative 
environmental (such as illnesses from nearby sewerage sites) and transport externalities 
(such as the consequences of being located next to railway tracks or roads with polluting 
and dangerous traffic).  The World Bank (2001) estimates conservatively
2 that more than 
300 million urban poor in developing countries live in slum and squatter settlements, 
most of them being squalid, unsafe environments that create health and security 
                                                 
1 We use the terms ‘slum’, ‘squatters’ and ‘informal settlements’ interchangeably in this paper 
2 Habitat estimates as many as 800 million, using different methodology. Location and Welfare in Cities  2
problems.
 3  Regionally, it is estimated that there are 200 million slum dwellers in Asia, 
more than 50 million in Latin America and the Caribbean, and more than 60 million in 
African cities.  
 
Many land policy interventions have efficiency objectives, that is, to realize the 
value of land for the landowners, and lead to the eviction of slum-dwellers, with or 
without compensation.  Some policy interventions are motivated by poverty-reduction 
objectives.  Policy interventions to enhance the welfare of the poor or the slum dwellers 
include ‘slum upgrading’ programs, which typically improve availability and access to 
local public services and amenities in situ. These programs may also include investments 
to improve the quality and characteristics of dwelling units. In principle, upgrading not 
only increases the welfare of the slum dwellers who have received these interventions, 
but may also ‘spill over’ to increase welfare of non-slum dwellers in the neighborhood.  
These external benefits could include increases in overall property values through 
improvements in neighborhood attributes (such as better exteriors and less garbage on the 
streets) as well as direct improvements in levels of public services (particularly those 
provided on a network, such as water supply and sanitation).  From a political economy 
perspective, the presence of benefit spillovers of slum upgrading programs to non-slum 
dwellers is important in ensuring the viability of upgrading initiatives.  This is because 
any strategy on behalf of the poor / slum dwellers is unlikely to be approved in the 
political or ‘voting’ process if it has adverse consequences or no benefits for non-poor / 
non-slum dwellers, who presumably bear a disproportionately higher burden of taxes to 
finance local public goods.  
  
This paper looks at the poverty-reduction objectives that improve the welfare of 
the slum-dweller, and not the efficiency objective of maximizing the value of the land.  
We examine the residential location decisions of slum dwellers and the impact of urban 
upgrading on their welfare.  In particular, we ask the following questions: (a) Why are 
slum dwellers willing to under-consume housing services and live in hazardous and 
under-serviced (albeit usually central) locations? (b) How do slum dwellers value 
                                                 
3 http://web.mit.edu/urbanupgrading/upgrading/ Location and Welfare in Cities  3
location-based attributes and amenities? and (c) What is the impact of slum upgrading on 
the welfare of the beneficiaries?  In future work, we will also take up the question of 
benefit spillovers to non-slum dwellers, and the relative gains to different groups from 
different interventions. 
 
To answer these questions, we first need to examine how households make 
residential location choices within a city, thereby sorting themselves across 
neighborhoods.  We must assess the relative premiums that households are willing to pay 
for intra-city differentials in location specific characteristics, such as access to 
employment opportunities, levels of public services and amenities, and socio-
demographic composition of the neighborhood or community.  Presumably, these 
location-based attributes translate into pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits.  For the 
empirical analysis, we employ a recently completed household survey from Pune, India 
to examine how households make residential location choices.  The survey is geo-
referenced and can be linked to neighborhood attributes, so that it becomes possible to 
examine spatially differentiated location choices across neighborhoods.  
 
We extend the analysis described above by considering a scenario in which 
growth, along with efforts to improve overall urban efficiency, creates pressure to reduce 
the volume of under-utilized land in central or high-value parts of the city.  A common 
perception is that slum and squatter settlements in central areas do not use land efficiently 
and productively.
4  Policies to increase land-use efficiency might involve the relocation 
or displacement of slum dwellers to peripheral or marginal lands.  There are numerous 
instances where slum dwellers have been evicted from their current locations.  For 
example, in 1999 a BBC report indicated that two million slum dwellers in Bangladesh 
were to be evicted and their homes demolished.  Apparently, the government announced 
that all slums in the capital city Dhaka were to be razed, and no alternate accommodation 
would be provided to these slum dwellers.
5  Similarly, in 2002, about 2,300 families 
                                                 
4 While there is abundance of anecdotal evidence pointing to the contrary, there is very little rigorous 
evidence showing that this perception is incorrect 
5 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/338153.stm; there are other similar cases, for instances 
Manila under the Marcos regime (see Jimenez 1984). Location and Welfare in Cities  4
living in slums near the Buckingham Canal in Chennai, India were evicted, and there was 
no clear indication on the nature of compensation provided to the displaced slum 
dwellers.
6   
 
The main normative goal of this analysis is to discover the mechanisms through 
which it is possible to protect or compensate for the loss of welfare among the poor, as 
policies and regulations are changed to improve aggregate efficiency in resource 
allocation.  If enhancing efficiency were the main objective of reforms, the resulting 
outcome would be Pareto-superior if, in principle, there would be net gains overall, after 
compensating those who are displaced (even if no compensation is actually given).  In 
practice, it is generally assumed that those relocated are worse off than they would have 
been had they remained in their original homes, that is, displacement of poor households 
reduces their welfare.  This is a cause for concern if poverty reduction is a separate 
objective, independent of increasing aggregate efficiency in resource allocation.  In 
addition, there is anecdotal evidence that the displaced simply return to their former 
places of residence, thus eliminating much of the supposed efficiency gains from 
resource reallocation. 
 
In this context, we ask the following additional questions: (a) What would be the 
welfare impact of relocating slum dwellers from their current locations to less desirable 
peripheral locations; and (b) Can we design a package of interventions that leaves the 
relocated households as well off as they would be if they had been allowed to remain in 
their current homes?  
 
  We make several methodological innovations to answer the questions raised here.  
First, we explicitly include a household’s preference for community structure in our 
estimation strategy, thereby allowing us to pick up premiums that households are willing 
to pay for non-pecuniary factors.  These include social and kinship networks in the 
community or neighborhood measured by sharing common language and religion, as well 
as similarities in educational attainment.  Second, we estimate a utility function where we 
                                                 
6 http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/08/09/stories/2002080907290300.htm Location and Welfare in Cities  5
assume that each household makes an optimal location choice given the set of 
alternatives and the location decisions of other households.  The estimates from this 
approach provide us with a household’s preferences for a set of neighborhood 
characteristics, which are allowed to vary across households.  
 
  Our general results from the empirical analysis show that households are willing 
to pay significant premiums to locate in areas that are composed of households sharing 
common socio-demographic characteristics.  Sorting takes place on own language and 
religion, similar educational attainment, and average length of tenure in the 
neighborhood.  Households are willing to pay significant premiums to maintain social 
and kinship networks.  In addition, although transport costs matter, they are less 
important, for slum-dwellers, than community characteristics.  
 
  We then use the estimation results to conduct set of simulations, to examine 
potential impacts of alternative slum interventions.  The interventions we examine are: 
 
1.  upgrading public services to households in situ; 
2.  relocating individual households from a central slum to a peripheral ward; 
3.  relocating individual households to a peripheral ward, and upgrading public 
services in the new location; 
4.  relocating communities to a peripheral ward; and 
5.  relocating communities to a peripheral ward, and upgrading public services. 
 
We can rank potential interventions in terms of their impact on the welfare of 
slum dwellers in Pune.  The simulations we conduct later in this paper reveal that relative 
to no intervention (allowing slum dwellers to remain in their current location, with the 
same service levels and housing conditions), upgrading services in situ is the only policy 
intervention examined that increases the welfare of the poor in the absence of any 
credible compensation mechanism.  
 
In summary, in this paper, we provide a general analytic strategy to evaluate the 
impact of potential interventions on the welfare of poor slum dwellers.  Following this Location and Welfare in Cities  6
introduction, the rest of the paper is organized in five sections.  Section II provides the 
analytic and estimation strategy.  In Section III, we provide some contextual information 
on Pune city, as well as describe some aspects of the data used for the empirical analysis. 
Results from the empirical analysis are provided in Section IV.  Impacts of relocation vs. 
upgrading are evaluated in Section V.  Section VI concludes and also presents additional 
questions that will be examined in future research.  
 
II. ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
 
In this section, we discuss various factors that influence residential location 
choices of households. Following this discussion, we present the estimation framework, 
and the simulation approach that is used to examine the impacts of slum upgrading and 
relocation interventions.  
 
Factors Influencing Residential Location Decisions 
 
 
  There is considerable antecedent analytic work examining the factors that 
influence residential location choices in urban areas.  There are three main factors that are 
generally modeled in this context: (a) commuting costs, (b) local public goods, and (c) 
individual preferences for community or neighborhood composition.
7 
 
The importance of commuting or transport costs is motivated by Alonso (1964) 
and Mills (1967) who demonstrate how residential choices are defined by the relationship 
between relative expenditures on commuting and land consumption.  They modeled the 
metropolitan area as a “monocentric city” – that is, the metropolitan area has a central 
business district (CBD) at its center to which each household commutes.  Taking a bid-
price approach to household location decisions where commuting or travel costs are 
capitalized in the bid-price for land, locations closer to the CBD are more valuable than 
those at the periphery.  In these bidding and sorting models, households maximize their 
                                                 
7 These models are inspired by US and European (primarily British) experience.  This paper provides an 
indirect test of the usefulness of these models for developing countries – although the evidence is 
suggestive rather than conclusive. Location and Welfare in Cities  7
bid-price offer for housing subject to the constraint that such payments leave the 
household no worse off than any other alternative.  If the demand for land is income 
elastic, then richer households will be better off by purchasing land that is further from 
the CBD and are compensated for the increase in travel or commuting costs.  In this case, 
we would see aggregate sorting of richer households toward the periphery and poorer 
households near the CBD. In contrast, if demand for land is income inelastic and 
commuting costs increase with income, then larger savings in commuting costs for the 
richer households will make them outbid poor households for the locations closer to the 
CBD.  Thus, the location choices of households and the final sorting outcome would 
depend on the extent to which the income elasticity of land demand is greater or smaller 
than the income elasticity of the cost of commuting.   
 
Our model accounts for the trade-off between the demand for land and 
commuting time, although we drop the restrictive assumption of the monocentric city.  
We have data on the ward in which each household head is primarily employed, and use 
that to construct a measure of the distance to work for each household.  Our estimation 
strategy allows the household to choose its location partly on the basis of the distance to 
its current job from each alternative residential location within the city.   
 
  Tiebout’s (1956) model of fiscal competition brings into play the role of local 
public services in the location decisions of households.  In this model, communities or 
jurisdictions provide public services (which are financed by local taxes) to their residents.  
In making a residential location choice, a household will shop across communities and 
choose the one that provides the composition and level of public services that best satisfy 
the household’s demand.  If expenditures on public goods increase with income, then 
households with different incomes will tend to choose different communities, and 
households in the same community will tend to have similar incomes (McGuire 1974; 
Berglas 1976; Wooders 1978).  In the aggregate, this may lead to sorting based on 
preferences and demand for locally financed public services.  In Pune, as in many 
developing-country cities, neither revenues nor services are locally (i.e., at the 
neighborhood or ward level) controlled.  However, we should still see sorting across level Location and Welfare in Cities  8
of services, since there is considerable intra-city variation in amenities and service 
delivery, even if the variation is not the result of competition among neighborhoods to 
attract tax-paying residents. 
 
  In addition to commuting costs and public service provision, individual 
preferences for community composition appear to be an important factor in the decision 
making process.  This is most famously articulated in the works of Thomas Schelling 
(1969, 1971, 1978) whose models of social interaction show that microeconomic forces 
such as discriminatory individual preferences or behavior lead to aggregate phenomena 
such as sorting and segregation.  This model implies that people are willing to pay 
differential premiums to live near others who share common socio-economic or 
demographic characteristics.  These characteristics include religion, class, language, 
educational attainment, and duration of stay and tenure in the city.  In a recent paper, Lall 
et al. (2004) argue that social interaction and participation tend to increase with cultural, 
ethnic or economic homogeneity.  In other words, individuals have an aversion to 
heterogeneity if it implies that they will be forced to associate with people who are not 
like themselves.  A “cost” of participation in neighborhood activities, therefore, is the act 
of association itself; and this cost is higher in more diverse communities.  
 
Jha et. al (2002) show that social networks in Delhi slums perform three main 
functions: survival, mobility, and providing access to public services.   For example, they 
find that friends and neighbors in the slum provided shelter to families who had their 
homes demolished.  Similarly, social networks provide avenues for slum dwellers to 
access credit in times of need, as well as routine informal services such as providing 
daycare to children and organizing “neighborhood watches” to keep an eye on property.  
We found similar anecdotal evidence of benefits from social and kinship networks during 
focus group community meetings that were held prior to implementing the household 
survey in Pune.  
 
  In reality, none of these analytic models can completely explain residential 
location choices by themselves.  A combined approach – including commuting costs, Location and Welfare in Cities  9
public services, and individual preferences for community characteristics – is likely to be 
more useful to examine the strength of the various sorting mechanisms on residential 
location choice decisions by households.  Furthermore, demand for various housing and 
neighborhood attributes varies with household characteristics.  Thus, the empirical work 
should be sensitive to inter-household differences in various characteristics (such as 
family size, number of earners, number of children) and the resulting differences in 
premiums for various housing and neighborhood amenities.  
 
  We now describe the analytic strategy and parametric estimates used to specify 




In this section we outline the estimation strategy for residential location choice. 
For estimation we use a random utility model in which utility to a household from 
alternative choices of wards (administrative unit) is specified as a linear function of 
characteristics of consumers, attributes of alternative choices of wards, and an error term. 
Specifically let 
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w X  represents the observed characteristic of the neighborhood for ith household in 
ward w.  To construct the neighborhood characteristics for each household we take the 
values of each household’s nearest 15 neighbors.  We assume that the household chooses 
between its current dwelling unit and a random dwelling unit in each of the other 47 
wards in the city.  For each household, therefore, we define the characteristics of the 
other wards as simply the ward averages.  These characteristics include the share of 
households in the neighborhood that are Hindu, scheduled caste, Marathi speakers, the 
proportion of female headed households, the average age of household heads in the ward, 
the average size of households in the ward, the number of children per household, the 
proportion who feel that the neighborhood is safe for women, the average number of Location and Welfare in Cities  10
years households have resided in their current house, the proportion of household heads 
born in the city, and the proportion of household heads with primary, secondary, or 
higher education.  
i
w D  is the commuting time of ith household from ward w to the ward 
where the head of the household works.  w d  is the dummy variable that captures the 
unobserved (to the econometrician) characteristics of the ward which can affect the 
household’s utility. These ward characteristics are observed by each household at the 
time they are making their decision but not captured in the data.  Ignoring these effects 
will bias the estimates, since they could be related to other observed characteristics of the 
ward like prices and socio-demographic factors.  
i
w ε  is the idiosyncratic error term. In our 
estimation we are assuming that each household takes the prices or ward premiums, as 
well as social and demographic characteristics associated with each ward as given and 
makes rational residential location choice decisions.  For purpose of estimation this 
assumption translates into a condition where the idiosyncratic error term is independent 




j α ’s for  } , , { p D X j∈  in equation (1) are the parameters of the utility 
function with respect to each attributes of the choices.  In our analysis, each household’s 
valuation of the choice characteristic is allowed to vary with its own characteristics, for 
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α  is the parameter that depends on household characteristics 
i
r Z .  These 
household characteristics are the same as those describing the ward characteristics, plus 
the log value of the income (flow) from durable goods to the household. 
 Location and Welfare in Cities  11




w V V ≥  for all k, where k indexes all the 
possible ward choices to ith household.  For estimation we will assume that 
i
w ε  is 
additively separable from the rest of the utility function, and has a Weibull distribution, 
which leads to a conditional logit specification,  
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  We use the estimates of our conditional logit model to derive the parameters of 
the utility function defined in (1). We can rewrite (1) by replacing the parameters with its 
estimated values. Specifically, 
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1
0 ˆ ˆ α α , for  } , , { p D X j∈ .  We will use equation (4) as the basis of 
our policy experiments. 
 
Simulations for examining the impact of policy interventions 
 
As mentioned earlier, we can use the empirical results to conduct a series of 
policy experiments, to examine the consequences of alternative interventions among 
slum-dwelling households.  In the first experiment, we upgrade basic services in a 
representative slum, by reducing by half the number of households without sewerage.  
Since we upgrade them at their current location, the only changes come from variations 
in access to public services; we evaluate the change in welfare for the slum dweller due to 
the upgrading.  Second, we displace the slum dweller from his current location to a 
peripheral location.  This is done in a number of ways: we relocate the slum dweller 
along with his original community, and we relocate him by himself.  In both cases, we 
also provide improved services in the new location.  For these cases, we evaluate the Location and Welfare in Cities  12
change in welfare of the slum dweller due to relocation and due to the change in services.  
Through these simulations, we will be able to evaluate the impact of alternate spatial 
interventions on the welfare of the slum dwellers. The results from these simulations are 
presented and discussed in Section V.  
 
 
III. CASE STUDY OF PUNE CITY 
 
 
In this section, we describe the dataset and variables that have been used in the empirical 
analysis. Pune has a population of 2.8 million, of whom close to one million live in slum 
settlements distributed throughout the city (Bapat and Agarwal 2003). The city is located 
in the state of Maharashtra, approximately 200 kilometers south east of Mumbai.  
 
The empirical analysis draws on household survey data from Pune, India, which 
was collected between August and October 2002, and designed to be representative of the 
Pune Municipal Corporation area. All households of the city are part of the sampling 
universe with the exception of residents of military cantonments and institutional 
populations (for example, prisons). For our survey, 2,850 households were randomly 
selected and they responded to questions regarding socioeconomic characteristics, quality 
and quantity of housing, tenure status, and access to infrastructure services. The final 
survey instrument also used a travel diary to record daily activity patterns of household 
members. To ensure that all parts of the city are covered by the sample, we chose sample 
fractions in each of the 48 wards (administrative units) in proportion to the number of 
households of that ward according to the preliminary estimates of the Census of March 
2001.  Primarily because of problems with limited responses for the travel diary, our final 
sample consists of 1,322 households – fewer than half of those originally interviewed.
8   
 
                                                 
8 We re-estimated the regressions using the entire sample, attributing to each household the mean values of 
travel times for nearest neighbors and wards, in the manner described above for neighborhood 
characteristics.  Those results (available on request) confirm the results presented here.  We use the 
restricted sample simply to reduce measurement error.   Location and Welfare in Cities  13
For the purpose of this analysis, we classified the households into four housing 
types.  These classes are based on the type of settlement in which they live.  Type 1 
households live in informal settlements (slums), Type 2 live in the core city, Type 3 live 
in formal developments, and Type 4 live in urban villages.  Informal settlements include 
households living in non-notified and notified slum and squatter settlements, slum 
resettlement communities, and unauthorized developments.  Table 1 shows that 40 
percent of sample households live in informal settlements.  Dwelling units in this 
category are smaller than units in the other three categories.  Figure 1 shows that sample 
households in informal settlements are not clustered or segregated in one part of the city, 
but in fact are spread all over the urban area.  It is useful to note that many notified slums 
are located on or near riverbanks, which are susceptible to flooding during the monsoons.  
 
  The survey data show that in general, dwelling unit characteristics in the informal 
settlements are considerably worse than in other housing categories.  For example, a 
majority of households living in informal settlements use community toilets.  In contrast, 
a large proportion of households in formal developments use WC toilets that are 
connected to a functioning sewer system.  The household survey also elicited the self-
assessed exterior condition of the dwelling unit.  We find that 27 percent of dwelling 
units in informal settlements have good exteriors compared to 65 percent for formal 
developments (see Table 2 for details).  
 
  As described in Section 2, the value of the dwelling unit is the household’s 
willingness to pay (WTP) for a set of dwelling unit and neighborhood characteristics.  To 
get an estimate of the household’s WTP, we ask each household the following questions: 
“What would be the estimated present market price for a similar unit in this 
neighborhood?” and “What would be the estimated monthly rental value for a similar unit 
in this neighborhood?”  A summary of both self-assessed purchase prices and monthly 
rents by housing category is also provided in Table 1.  Residents of informal settlements 
(Type 1) estimate the total monthly rental value of their dwellings at less than one-third 
that of residents of formal developments (Type 3).  On the other hand, the unit rental Location and Welfare in Cities  14
value (per square foot) of Type 1 dwellings (Rupees 3.34) is identical to that of Type 4 
dwellings (Rupees 3.39). 
 
  For a casual indication of the extent to which households are satisfied with their 
current location attributes, we asked subjective questions on perceptions of satisfaction 
with various dwelling unit and location characteristics.  Table 3 shows that most 
households are satisfied with their current residential locations.  While satisfaction with 
location is lowest among households living in informal settlements, it is still quite high at 
88 percent.  When asked about basic infrastructure and services, a smaller share of 
households reports being satisfied.  This is particularly the case for residents of informal 
settlements, of whom 30 percent expressed dissatisfaction with the level infrastructure 
and service provision.  However, fewer than ten percent of respondents expressed any 
desire to make changes in their current home, or move to a new home.  Among those 
households, residents of informal settlements and urban villages were much more 
interested in improvements to basic services (7 and 8 percent, respectively) than moving 
to a new home (2 and 1 percent, respectively).  Conversely, residents of more formal 
settlements were relatively more interested in moving to a new home. 
  
  Since transport or commuting costs are an important part of the analytic models 
and empirical strategy, we provide some contextual information on mode used by 
household heads for commuting to work.  These data are collected from travel diaries that 
were used to record activity patterns of household members.  Walking and using two-
wheelers such as scooters and motorcycles are the dominant modes (25 percent each) 
followed by bus and bicycle (see Figure 2).  Poor households tend to walk or ride a 
bicycle, having relatively shorter commuting times and distances compared to households 
using motorized transport.  The empirical analysis in the next section provides the details 
on the impact of commuting costs and travel times on residential location choices. 
 
As noted above, we conduct the policy simulations on four types of households, 
which differ in their household- and dwelling unit-characteristics.  Table 4 describes the 
characteristics of the households used in the simulations and their neighborhoods.  We Location and Welfare in Cities  15
have chosen four archetypal wards, to represent the characteristics and environments of 
our four housing types, selecting the wards in which each type of household 
predominates.  For instance, Type 1 households are predominant in ward 38.  As with 
most of the city’s residents, Type 1 households in ward 38 are likely to be Marathi-
speaking and Hindu.  About half are from scheduled castes.  Type 1 households have as 
many members as the average households, but they have more children than average.  
These households are significantly poorer, and they are more likely to be uneducated, 
than residents of other types of settlements.  The characteristics of the ward in which our 
archetypal Type 1 resident lives (ward 38) reflects the characteristics of the predominant 
group – that is, by definition, Type 1 residents.  The characteristics of Type 2, 3, and 4 
households are also presented in Table 4.   
 
The final column of this table presents the characteristics of a typical ward on the 
periphery of the city.  In the simulations below, we examine the impact of moving Type 1 
households from the ward in which they predominate (38) to this outlying ward (5).  In 
our simulations, a significant portion of the welfare impact of relocation is felt through 
differences in the characteristics of the destination ward.  For instance, while nearly half 
of ward 38 residents are from scheduled castes, none of the residents in ward 5 are.  This 
distinction begs the question of how much (if any) of a relocated household’s reaction to 
the relocation is a due to any discrimination he experiences from residents of his new 
district, and how much is due to his own demand for homogeneity of community.
9 
 
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
In this section we describe the results of the conditional logit (McFadden) 
regression of location choice as a function of the characteristics of the household and the 
neighborhood in which the dwelling is located.  Tables 5 and 6 present the results of the 
conditional logit regression on location choice.  The coefficients in Table 5 are difficult 
to interpret: they indicate a group’s preference for characteristics of neighborhoods 
                                                 
9 We are examining the welfare impact of the intervention only from the perspective of the relocated 
household, and not from the perspective of the resident of the receiving ward.  One measure of the relative Location and Welfare in Cities  16
relative to mean preferences, which are presented in Table 6.  We will not dwell on the 
significance and specific inference of these parameter estimates – we discuss them briefly 
here, but proceed quickly to the simulations.   
 
A few of the coefficients on the diagonal of Table 5 are strongly significant, 
indicating sorting within these classes of households.  For instance, scheduled caste 
households are more likely to choose wards in which there are more scheduled caste 
households; and households that have been longer resident prefer neighbors of similarly 
longer tenure.  Wealthier households (those with greater income from assets) prefer to 
live among wealthier neighbors.  One hypothesis that we maintained in the construction 
of the structural model was that female-headed households might exhibit significantly 
different preferences from the mean.  This turns out not to be true – the interactions with 
a dummy for female-headed households are neither individually nor jointly significant.  
Table 6 presents the results for the community characteristics, without interactions.  
These are similarly hard to interpret, since the overall effect is the sum of these 
parameters and their interactions, at the means.    
 
 
V. IMPACT OF ALTERNATE POLICY INTERVENTIONS 
 
In this section we present a simulation of two sets of plausible urban land policy 
interventions.  The first involves upgrading the sewer system in a ward in which slum-
dwelling households predominate.  The second is to relocate these slum dwelling 
households from their current location to a peripheral location (ward). 
 
Using the parameter estimates derived above, we conduct five simulation 
exercises, which correspond to alternative combinations of these two policies.  To recap, 
these are:  
1.  upgrading public services to slum households in situ; 
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2. relocating  individual  households from a central slum to a peripheral ward; 
3.  relocating individual households to a peripheral ward, and upgrading public 
services in the new location; 
4.  relocating communities to a peripheral ward; and 
5.  relocating communities to a peripheral ward, and upgrading public services. 
 
We posit that the first option dominates the others, at least from the perspective of 
the household.  Policy options 2 and 3 involve the removal of an individual household 
from its original dwelling, and from its community, to a peripheral ward.  In options 4 
and 5, we relocate households as communities to a peripheral ward.  In these simulation, 
we move a household from his original location to a peripheral ward, and replicate in his 
new location the characteristics of the community from which he was removed.  His new 
location is identical to his old location in every respect, except in the distance he must 
travel to work; we assume that the relocation does not require that he find new 
employment.   
 
The results of these simulation exercises are summarized in Table 7 and Figure 3.  
We will discuss the results of each simulation in turn. 
1)  Upgrading slum dwellers in situ. In this exercise we upgrade the representative 
slum dweller by decreasing the share of slum households which is not connected 
to the sewer system.  In ward 38 (where our archetypal slum-dweller lives), 27.1 
percent of households are not connected to the sewer system.  For the simulation, 
we cut this in half, to 13.6 percent.  This improves the average condition of 
dwelling units in that ward, and has a positive impact on the welfare of slum 
dwellers.   
2)  Relocating slum dwellers individually (without upgrading).  In this scenario, we 
simply move a slum household from his current dwelling to a peripheral ward.  
His neighborhood now has the characteristics of ward 5, rather than ward 38, 
whence he was removed.  In this case, his welfare drops by more than 16 percent, 
relative to the base case (the status quo ante). 
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3)  Relocating the individual household, plus upgrading services.  In this scenario, 
we move the individual household from ward 38 to ward 5, but we upgrade the 
local sewer system as in simulation (1); that is, we decrease the share of 
households without sewerage to 13.6 percent.  The relocated household certainly 
considers this an improvement over the previous case – but still, his welfare 
declines 11 percent relative to the case in which he is allowed to remain in his 
current dwelling. 
4)  Relocating slum dwellers as a community, without upgrading services.  In this 
case, as discussed above, we relocate the slum dweller from his original home to a 
new home in a community at the periphery, which is identical in almost every 
respect to his original community.  We can think of this simulation as moving the 
slum dweller, together with the entire population of his neighborhood, to the new 
peripheral location.  This policy maintains the community structure – the social 
networks or social capital – in which the slum-dweller had invested in his original 
community.  Clearly, this dominates the previous two simulations in which the 
household is relocated by itself.  However, even in this case, the household is 
burdened by the increase in the distance it must travel from its new location to its 
place of work (which we assume does not change).  The increased commuting 
distance is equivalent to a 3.5 percent drop in welfare.   
5)  Relocating slum dwellers as a community, plus upgrading services.  Here we 
move the community, as in simulation (4), plus we upgrade the sewer system as in 
simulations (1) and (3).  As in simulation (4), the slum-dweller suffers from the 
increase in commuting costs, but he benefits from keeping his community intact.  
In addition, he benefits from the improvements to public services.  Coincidentally, 
the welfare benefit from improved local sewer services (as before, so that 13.6 
percent of households are without sewerage) is exactly enough to counteract the 
loss in welfare due to the travel time.  In this case, the household is just as well off 
as he was in the absence of any intervention.   
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These simulations permit us to order these interventions in terms of their impact on 
the welfare of residents living in Pune’s informal settlements.  In order of preference (but 
maintaining the original numbering), these are: 
 
best 
1. upgrade  services  in situ; 
5.  relocate as a community, with improved services; 
4.  relocate as a community, without improved services; 
2. relocate  individuals  with improved services; 




The simulations show that relative to no intervention (allowing slum dwellers to 
remain in their current location, with current levels of public services), upgrading 
services in situ is the only one of these interventions that increases welfare of the slum 
dwellers.  In contrast, policies 4, 2, and 3 (from this list) reduce welfare, with the greatest 
loss coming from option 3.  If individual households are relocated from current locations 
to peripheral areas in the city, they would require additional compensation to leave them 
as well off as before the intervention. However, it must be mentioned that these results 
are sensitive to the characteristics of the ward to which these households are relocated. 
One general pattern which emerges from these results is that ward characteristics play an 
important role on household welfare and therefore should be accounted for in relocation 
and resettlement programs.   
 
In option 5, in which the community is relocated and provided with better 
services, relocated households maintain the same community structure they had 
previously – there is minimal disruption to social networks.  However, it is quite likely 
that access to other public services (water supply, solid waste collection, local schools 
and clinics, public transport) is considerably lower than at the previous more central 
location.  Upgrading these other services to reduce the costs of displacement may even be 
welfare enhancing, relative to the status quo ante.  In this case, no additional Location and Welfare in Cities  20
compensation is required, since the service improvements are sufficient to compensate 
for the loss incurred through the relocation.   
 
These simulations suggest that individuals (both poor and non poor) place great 
value on the ability to live near others who share common socio-demographic 
characteristics. These characteristics include own religion and language (ethnicity), 
education attainment (human capital), and duration of tenure.
10  In addition, households 
appear to have an aversion to wealth inequality, measured as the mean log deviation of 
income from assets.  All these characteristics are indicators of the extent to which 
residents potentially interact with their peers, either for sharing information or providing 
a wide range of formal and informal services (including engaging in collective action; see 
Baland and Platteau, 1995).  Displacing individual households (as in options 2 and 3), 
will have significant impacts on social and kinship networks.  The loss of these networks 
imposes a significant cost, in terms of welfare, on relocated households.  We find that in 
this case, improved services are not commensurate with this loss, and would necessitate 
much larger compensatory income transfers to leave the households as well off as before. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
We have established that different policies for urban development have 
significantly different consequences for the welfare of slum dwellers.  Clearly, improving 
dwelling unit quality on site dominates other options, such as relocation, even to 
improved dwelling units elsewhere.  We have also shown that it is possible to find a 
package of interventions, in the form of service improvements, that compensates for the 
welfare loss incurred by the relocation.  However, these results may be specific to Pune; 
it remains to be seen whether similar results will be obtained in other cities. Moreover, 
these results are also sensitive to the characteristics of the ward to which households are 
relocated. 
                                                 
10 There are several reasons why duration of tenure and tenure security matter, such as greater incentive to 
invest in housing and community (Hoff and Sen 2002), and greater gains from social interaction (Hofferth 
and Iceland 1998,  Bardhan 1993). Location and Welfare in Cities  21
 
Another contribution of our work is that the general methodology presented in this 
paper can be used in various settings to examine the potential impact of resettlement and 
relocation programs. Once we know the neighborhood characteristics, we are able to 
measure the welfare changes in relocated or resettled wards. 
 
This research has focused on the welfare consequences of alternative policies on the 
welfare of slum dwellers.  Although these results suggest significant welfare spillovers 
from policies that focus on slums to residents of other settlements, future work will 
confirm and measure these effects.
11  The results yield the partial equilibrium impact of 
slum policies: we do include residential externalities of neighborhood composition, but 
we do not examine the city-wide general equilibrium effects of alternative uses of 
vacated slums in the case of relocation.  While upgrading slums in “premium” locations 
is certainly welfare enhancing for the slum dwellers, the opportunity cost of land to the 
city for alternative uses may be relatively much higher at the same location. It may be 
that an alternative use of the land, such as the construction of a shopping center, is Pareto 





                                                 
11 Further work will also involve some methodological extensions. For example, we include ward-level 
dummies to capture both unobserved heterogeneity and within-ward correlations.  However, it is possible 
that prices and other characteristics are likely to exhibit significant correlation over space, within and 
across wards.  The price of houses in each ward will be related in some way to the price of houses in 
adjoining wards, controlling for house and ward-level attributes. 
12 Again, the Pareto criterion is usually applied in principle rather than in practice.   Location and Welfare in Cities  22
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VIII. TABLES AND FIGURES 
  
 
Table 1: Dwelling Unit Characteristics  








Monthly Rent  
(Rs.) 
1 Informal Settlements  1137  40%  277  175,521  926 
2 Core City Housing  643  23%  341  599,181  2,305 
3 Formal 
Developments 
870 31%  637 763,566  3,325 
4 Urban Village  199  7%  542  425,447  1,836 
Source: Pune Household Survey, 2001, The World Bank 
 
 
Table 2: Quality of Dwelling Unit 






Developments Urban  Village
Exterior        
Good   27%  27%  65%  50% 
Passable 53%  53%  31%  44% 
Dilapidated 20%  21%  4%  6% 
        
Interior        
Good   29%  30%  69%  52% 
Livable 56%  56%  29%  45% 
Dilapidated 15%  14%  2%  4% 
Total 1137  643  870  199 
Source: Pune Household Survey, 2001, The World Bank 
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Developments  Urban Village
Location        
Dissatisfied 10%  4%  3%  5% 
Neutral 2%  1%  0%  3% 
Satisfied 88%  95%  97%  92% 
        
Infrastructure/ Basic Services        
Dissatisfied 30%  15%  12%  43% 
Neutral 6%  6%  1%  4% 
Satisfied 64%  79%  86%  53% 
        
Would you …..        
Upgrade current home?  7%  1%  1%  8% 
Move to a new home?  2%  6%  3%  1% 
do nothing?  91%  93%  96%  91% 
        
Total 1137  643  870  199 
Source: Pune Household Survey, 2001, The World Bank 
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Hindu 0.961 0.872 1.000 0.880 1.000
Scheduled caste 0.471 0.426 0.132 0.200 0.000
Marathi speaking 0.961 0.809 0.921 0.800 1.000
Female headed household 0.059 0.085 0.079 0.000 0.000
Household size 4.686 4.681 4.158 5.040 4.833
Number of children 1.431 0.723 1.053 1.320 1.000
Ln (years in house) 2.684 3.855 2.263 2.427 2.891
Ln (income from durable goods) 7.615 8.691 8.754 8.192 7.812
Primary education 0.627 0.723 0.263 0.560 0.833
Secondary education 0.078 0.064 0.079 0.240 0.000
Higher education 0.059 0.149 0.526 0.080 0.167
Neighborhood characteristics
Share Hindu 0.923 0.892 0.993 0.901 0.967
Share Scheduled caste 0.384 0.399 0.212 0.304 0.411
Share Marathi speaking 0.954 0.799 0.916 0.781 0.900
Mean ln (years in house) 2.692 3.794 2.357 2.335 2.447
Share who believe area is safe for women 0.856 0.974 0.733 0.552 0.556
Mean ln (income from durable goods) 7.686 8.598 8.633 8.412 7.961
Share primary education 0.617 0.695 0.309 0.504 0.756
Share secondary education 0.047 0.051 0.105 0.224 0.000
Share higher education 0.110 0.191 0.404 0.155 0.144
Mean ln (hours of water per week) 4.595 4.453 4.196 3.200 3.599
Share of dwellings with no sewer 0.271 0.021 0.123 0.611 0.356
Share of dwellings with good exterior 0.303 0.342 0.565 0.509 0.433
Mean ln (stated rent) 6.558 7.554 7.378 7.079 6.945
Mean log deviation of durables income 0.391 0.548 0.669 0.488 0.636
Mean distance to work 2.972 3.030 5.027 5.664 8.233
Mean distance to work squared 15.448 14.686 35.017 50.717 83.238
N 5 14 73 82 5 6Location and Welfare in Cities  27
 




















Share Hindu -1.555 2.213 1.333 -2.927 -2.053 2.079 1.036 2.241 -6.743 -11.951 -1.840
(3.157) (1.858) (2.519) (3.284) (0.565) ** (0.836) * (0.862) (0.832) ** (2.639) * (3.666) ** (3.660)
Share Scheduled caste -2.144 3.934 -0.510 0.108 0.251 -0.572 1.151 -0.185 3.828 3.561 4.391
(1.538) (0.885) ** (1.153) (1.611) (0.273) (0.396) (0.440) ** (0.378) (1.191) ** (1.735) * (1.774) *
Share Marathi speaking 2.892 -1.333 2.477 1.770 0.629 -0.396 -1.958 -1.339 2.346 4.709 0.238
(2.302) (1.412) (1.909) (2.483) (0.436) (0.640) (0.674) ** (0.647) * (1.909) (2.817) + (2.677)
Mean ln (years in house) -1.209 0.113 -0.525 -0.245 0.215 -0.164 0.976 -0.124 1.422 0.931 2.608
(0.609) * (0.339) (0.456) (0.602) (0.112) + (0.158) (0.160) ** (0.147) (0.486) ** (0.664) (0.663) **
Share who believe area is safe for women -0.498 0.291 -0.518 0.698 -0.133 -0.338 0.884 0.812 1.892 3.758 2.472
(1.382) (0.782) (1.035) (1.430) (0.251) (0.343) (0.349) * (0.331) * (1.057) + (1.473) * (1.474) +
Mean ln (income from durable goods) 0.060 1.002 0.901 -0.737 -0.122 0.301 0.305 0.761 -1.418 -4.613 -1.806
(0.979) (0.548) + (0.745) (0.991) (0.176) (0.250) (0.255) (0.229) ** (0.772) + (1.119) ** (1.043) +
Share primary education -2.374 2.403 -0.124 2.141 -0.673 -0.684 2.266 0.459 1.732 2.523 -0.400
(2.553) (1.480) (1.984) (2.736) (0.489) (0.692) (0.693) ** (0.698) (2.052) (2.955) (2.944)
Share secondary education -9.762 1.667 -5.332 1.401 0.497 -0.658 -0.259 -3.501 9.368 9.683 12.771
(3.766) ** (2.266) (2.937) + (4.200) (0.718) (1.031) (1.068) (1.048) ** (3.260) ** (4.518) * (4.517) **
Share higher education -0.097 0.946 -1.390 0.492 -1.058 -1.635 1.000 -0.794 7.312 16.007 7.055
(3.371) (1.990) (2.566) (3.580) (0.651) (0.909) + (0.911) (0.898) (2.767) ** (3.923) ** (3.919) +
Mean ln (hours of water per week) -0.217 0.023 -1.093 0.423 0.236 0.017 0.263 -0.345 -0.271 -0.810 0.565
(0.567) (0.281) (0.416) ** (0.534) (0.096) * (0.132) (0.139) + (0.128) ** (0.381) (0.554) (0.554)
Share of dwellings with no sewer -0.307 0.832 -2.703 0.391 0.100 -0.153 0.436 0.092 2.374 3.299 4.363
(1.218) (0.760) (0.956) ** (1.447) (0.246) (0.346) (0.334) (0.332) (1.146) * (1.526) * (1.492) **
Share of dwellings with good exterior -1.294 -0.409 0.411 -2.501 0.721 -0.220 1.465 -0.578 0.995 -0.339 6.162
(1.763) (1.039) (1.381) (1.788) (0.328) * (0.466) (0.486) ** (0.464) (1.449) (2.039) (2.041) **
Mean ln (stated rent) 1.789 -0.734 -0.165 1.600 -0.174 -0.098 0.054 0.611 0.743 2.748 1.142
(0.935) + (0.528) (0.715) (0.987) (0.169) (0.241) (0.252) (0.232) ** (0.781) (1.086) * (1.040)
Mean log deviation of durables income -0.067 -1.274 1.537 1.066 -0.349 0.509 0.213 0.448 0.713 -0.436 2.021
(1.077) (0.649) * (0.896) + (1.154) (0.210) + (0.289) + (0.309) (0.286) (0.924) (1.303) (1.229) +
Mean distance to work -0.056 -0.068 0.084 -0.044 0.012 -0.004 -0.005 0.032 0.065 -0.172 0.205
(0.156) (0.075) (0.102) (0.141) (0.025) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.103) (0.145) (0.148)
Mean distance to work squared 0.016 0.007 -0.008 0.008 0.000 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.013 -0.010
(0.017) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
Chi
2 tests of joint significance (16 df) (30.24) * (40.33) ** (38.84) ** (10.93) (69.47) ** (27.56) * (150.50) ** (78.26) ** (43.76) ** (52.59) ** (55.61) **
Note: ** significant at <.01, * significant at <.05, + significant at <.10.
Own characteristicLocation and Welfare in Cities  28
 
Table 6: Parameter estimates on other variables in conditional logit regression 
 
Share Hindu 10.045 Ward 2 -4.443 Ward 18 -12.557 Ward 34 -14.765
(7.980) (0.630) ** (0.725) ** (0.826) **
Share Scheduled caste -5.654 Ward 3 -9.448 Ward 19 -11.033 Ward 35 -12.576
(3.569) (0.698) ** (0.703) ** (0.751) **
Share Marathi speaking 3.805 Ward 4 -11.927 Ward 20 -12.462 Ward 36 -11.198
(6.123) (0.700) ** (0.641) ** (0.729) **
Mean ln (years in house) -6.589 Ward 5 -7.587 Ward 21 -10.713 Ward 37 -14.876
(1.409) ** (0.896) ** (0.630) ** (0.732) **
Share who believe area is safe for women -4.831 Ward 6 -5.842 Ward 22 -13.646 Ward 38 -14.835
(3.189) (0.538) ** (0.705) ** (0.734) **
Mean ln (income from durable goods) -9.898 Ward 7 -5.099 Ward 23 -8.003 Ward 39 -12.895
(2.236) ** (0.569) ** (0.690) ** (0.769) **
Share primary education 10.301 Ward 8 -8.054 Ward 24 -5.697 Ward 40 -13.247
(6.311) (0.602) ** (0.619) ** (0.734) **
Share secondary education 60.133 Ward 9 -8.659 Ward 25 -9.788 Ward 41 -7.948
(9.468) ** (0.632) ** (0.635) ** (0.851) **
Share higher education 18.248 Ward 10 -7.539 Ward 26 -4.948 Ward 42 -13.236
(8.206) * (0.644) ** (1.042) ** (0.834) **
Mean ln (hours of water per week) 4.804 Ward 11 -9.876 Ward 27 -12.078 Ward 43 -6.196
(1.201) ** (0.761) ** (0.658) ** (0.826) **
Share of dwellings with no sewer -15.653 Ward 12 -1.910 Ward 28 -8.346 Ward 44 -12.447
(3.176) ** (0.624) ** (0.790) ** (0.840) **
Share of dwellings with good exterior -6.404 Ward 13 -9.968 Ward 29 -7.846 Ward 45 -13.891
(4.320) (0.661) ** (0.665) ** (0.821) **
Mean ln (stated rent) -10.919 Ward 14 -8.534 Ward 30 -9.971 Ward 46 -10.277
(2.247) ** (0.623) ** (0.695) ** (0.742) **
Mean log deviation of durables income -15.364 Ward 15 -9.049 Ward 31 -13.814 Ward 47 -11.182
(2.591) ** (0.608) ** (0.754) ** (0.792) **
Mean distance to work -0.825 Ward 16 -7.748 Ward 32 -14.040 Ward 48 -8.969
(0.309) ** (0.634) ** (0.792) ** (0.786) **
Mean distance to work squared 0.012 Ward 17 -11.217 Ward 33 -11.558
(0.028) (0.736) ** (0.804) **
Neighborhood characteristics Ward dummy variables
Note: ** significant at <.01, * significant at <.05, + 
significant at <.10.Location and Welfare in Cities  29
 











Upgrading in original location 3.39
Relocating individual -16.66
Relocating individual + upgrading -11.14
Relocating community -3.41
Relocating community + upgrading  -0.02Location and Welfare in Cities  30








T y p e  1T y p e  2T y p e  3T y p e  4
Share Hindu 18.62 19.91 21.70 16.66
Share Scheduled caste -1.37 0.98 -2.72 -2.03
Share Marathi speaking -2.77 -6.58 -3.89 -2.54
Mean ln (years in house) -4.65 -2.99 -4.62 -4.60
Share who believe area is safe for women 3.45 6.08 4.59 4.22
Mean ln (income from durable goods) -3.43 -2.91 -3.46 -4.21
Share primary education 15.87 19.77 14.37 15.10
Share secondary education 27.92 27.85 25.88 28.53
Share higher education 12.89 15.66 13.12 14.17
Mean ln (hours of water per week) 2.58 2.74 2.35 2.46
Share of dwellings with no sewer -14.00 -12.30 -13.08 -13.33
Share of dwellings with good exterior -4.03 -2.13 -3.06 -4.16
Mean ln (stated rent) -5.02 -4.15 -3.60 -4.33
Mean log deviation of durables income -10.88 -10.40 -9.39 -10.89
Mean distance to work -0.51 -0.45 -0.38 -0.50
Mean distance to work squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
household typeLocation and Welfare in Cities  31
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Pune: Location of Households in Squatter
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Figure 2: Travel to work 
Trips to work place
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Figure 3: Welfare change from alternative interventions 
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